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**“The Impact of Political Parties on Public Support for European  
Integration”**

*This paper is not a stand-alone article, but one of the key analysis chapters from a larger project, a summary of which is below:*

*(Dissertation) Abstract*

This study builds on previous explanations of public support for European integration by investigating the influence that political parties have on the opinions of mass publics in Europe. Existing research finds that support for European integration varies with the perceived costs and benefits of the integration process (Gabel 1998), economic conditions (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993) or levels of post-materialism (Inglehart 1977). The complexity of the “European issue” suggests that individuals are likely to take informational short cuts to help them in forming attitudes towards European integration. For many people European Union (EU) matters are too distant from their daily lives, and therefore individuals use the stance of their preferred political party as a short cut for formulating an opinion. Previous research has found that political parties play an important cue-giving role on many political issues. This study begins from this rational approach to political opinion formation, and applies it to attitudes towards European integration.

The data used for the study come from the biannual Eurobarometer surveys and Comparative Manifestoes Project in the nine countries that were members of the EC/EU throughout the period from 1975 to 1999. The analysis on a pooled cross-sectional time series dataset, using ordered logit techniques, reveals that partisan effects are substantively greater than previous explanations of attitudes to European integration, such as economic circumstances and utilitarian costs/benefits. Further analysis reveals that parties are more likely to influence attitudes to integration when individuals feel stronger attachments with the party, when the saliency of the integration issue is greater, and when the party is perceived as being united on the issue. These findings have serious implications for both EU-wide policy decisions and for the future of European integration at such a crucial juncture in the EU’s history. With major structural changes expected in the next decade, such as widespread expansion and a common EU foreign and defence policy, this research shows that national political parties can play a major part in furthering (or obstructing) the future of European politics at the supranational level.

*Introduction*

This chapter analyses survey data that relate to public opinion across the European Union. The empirical analysis tests the partisan cue-giving hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. The models that are investigated are adapted from the rational choice cue-giving body of research developed in the previous chapter. These models are examined alongside the main economic and social explanations of public support for European integration that were discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter begins with a discussion of the data and how key concepts are operationalised in order to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. The chapter then discusses the methods employed to test the main hypotheses and explains how the use of these methods fits into the overall research design of the thesis. The key concern of this chapter is to present evidence to support the theory of partisan cue-giving across countries in Europe. Hence, the first section of the results presents the results from of a generalisable model, across space and time. Finally, to check the validity of this general approach further analysis is presented of more static models that are both time and unit (country) specific.

*Data*

The individual level data are taken from numerous Eurobarometer public opinion surveys conducted between 1975 and 1999. These data are commissioned by the European Commission, conducted by INRA (Europe) and stored at the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung in Cologne. The surveys are conducted biannually, in both the spring and the autumn. They include a random sample of roughly one thousand respondents from each country per survey. All current member countries are included in the sample. For this research project all the member countries that have been members throughout the time period involved (1975-99) are included in the analysis. These countries are the original six founder members: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and the countries of the first expansion in the 1973: Britain, Ireland and Denmark<sup>1</sup>. The pooled time-series dataset has nine cross-sections (countries) and twenty-five units (years), with over 400,000 cases. There are a number of problems with using these data (see for example: Katz 1985, Schmitt 1989 or Sinnott 1998). However, the Eurobarometer series is an unprecedented source of survey data that is both longer and more internally consistent than any other data source for comparative analysis of Western European public opinion (for a positive approach to the use of these data see Reif & Inglehart 1991).

The analysis in this chapter is at the individual level. Given that the phenomenon that is of interest here, namely support for European integration, is an individual attitudinal one, the individual level of analysis is most appropriate. Other research (such as Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, Anderson & Kalthenthaler 1996) uses aggregate level research to investigate levels of support for European integration. This method will be developed in the following chapter in order to demonstrate some of the differences and similarities between the aggregate of individuals in different countries and at different points in time. However, to accurately explain individual-level behaviour, greater leverage can be obtained from an individual-level analysis.

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<sup>1</sup> There is no theoretical reason why the other 6 countries that joined later cannot be included in the analysis from when they joined the Union (Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995). However, the data analysis is already an ambitious project with over 400,000 cases. In the interests of both manageability and parsimony, the analysis is restricted to individuals from the countries with the longest data availability.

The model, which will be discussed in more detail below, will essentially combine a partisanship component with previous explanations of support for European integration. To test whether partisanship does have an influence on individual attitudes to European integration variables will be specified that capture the partisanship of individuals, including the strength of that partisanship. Economic, socio-demographic and attitudinal variables will also be included in the model as controls for existing explanations of support.

### *Operationalisation*

One of the most inconsistent aspects of research on support for European integration to date has been the operationalisation of the dependent variable. There are a number of variables used in the Eurobarometer data surveys, all basically tapping into one underlying current of European integration (see Niedermayer 1995, Deflem and Pampel 1996).

The dependent variable, support for the European Union (*membership*), is operationalised with the following question:

“Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing, bad thing or neither good nor bad?”

The variable (*Membership*) is coded as 3 if the respondent replies good thing, 1 if bad thing and 2 if neither good nor bad. The three other questions asked that have also been used for measuring public opinion towards European integration are:

“In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?”  
(*unification*)

“If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?” (*dissolution*)

“Taking everything into consideration, would you say that your country has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” (*Benefit*)

The principle debate around the use of the various questions centres around whether or not the questions are measuring affective or utilitarian support (see in particular Gabel 1998a, chapter 2). In David Easton’s (1975) evaluation of political support he distinguishes between affective and utilitarian support for political institutions. According to Easton, affective support is a long-lasting attachment to a political institution that is stable over time. Utilitarian support, however, varies with the perception of costs and benefits from a particular institution or policy, and is therefore more susceptible to short-term factors. Gabel finds that, according to this Eastonian (1965, 1975) model of public support, the *membership* question taps into utilitarian support, whereas the *unification* question taps into affective support.

There are a number of reasons why the membership question is chosen for this research. This chapter seeks to extend the rational choice theory of support developed in chapter 3. Thus, following from Gabel’s work (1998a), this chapter investigates utilitarian, rather than affective, levels of support for the EU. Easton (1975) asserts that affective public support will largely reflect an individual’s political socialisation over time, as well as the accumulation of evaluations of the institution’s (EU) performance. Almost by definition affective support will be relatively stable. Therefore, assuming that the *unification* question actually measures affective support, there will be little theoretical reason to suppose that either party cues or short-term economic circumstances will alter those levels of support. Niedermayer (1995) contends that the *dissolution*

and *membership* questions also tap into this affective dimension. Handley, however, asserts that the differences between gauging these affective and utilitarian dimensions are “fairly ambiguous for all but the most cognitively mobile respondents” (1981, 348).

There is also a data-guided reason for using the *membership* question as the dependent variable. This question has been the most consistently and frequently asked of the support for the EU questions in the Eurobarometer project. That enables us to investigate the effects of party on EU support over the longest period of time. It allows us greater leverage in evaluating the comparability over time, but also the differences between time periods.

High levels of correlation between the various measures of support for integration, as well as factor analysis of these variables, suggests that they essentially measure one basic underlying factor – support for European integration. Tabachnik and Fidell (2001) warn against pooling several samples for factor analytical purposes (2001, 587), therefore, the factor analysis was conducted on one Eurobarometer study (43.1 from spring 1995) that included all four variables of interest. The factor loadings of the variables were extremely high, reinforcing the assertion that they measure one underlying factor. The greater the loading, the more the variable is a pure measure of the underlying factor. Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest that factor loadings in excess of .71 should be considered an excellent predictor of the underlying factor. All four variables have a loading above this threshold: membership=.87, dissolution=.85, unification=.82 and benefit=.77. Figure 1 shows the eigenvalues from the factor analysis of the four variables. The number of factors can be gauged by the structural breaks in the slopes of the eigenvalues, therefore Figure 1 shows that there is just one factor being measured. Eigenvalues represent variance, of which each standardised variable brings a variance of one to the principal components extraction. Thus, the factors that have eigenvalues of less than one demonstrate less importance than an observed variable (Tabachnik and Fidell 2001).

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In his influential study Gabel (1998a) creates a variable from the *membership* question that runs from 0 to 100. Gabel and Palmer (1995), Gabel and Whitten (1997) and Gabel (1998b) use a dependent variable from both the *membership* and *unification* questions. Their dependent variable is a sum of the individual responses to both questions, which is then standardised by the total and multiplied by 100 to create a scale running from 0 to 100. In Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) study of aggregate change in support for the EU, they subtract the percentage of respondents responding that their country’s membership of the EU is a “bad thing” from those replying “good thing”. They completely ignore those respondents that choose the category “neither good nor bad”, and thus take no account of the great differences in levels that exist between countries in this intermediate category. Deflem and Pampel (1996) use a scale based on the factor analysis scores of the membership, unification and dissolving questions, which has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

An overview of the distribution of the dependent variable can be seen in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the responses to the *membership* question aggregated by biannual Eurobarometer from spring 1975 to spring 1999. Inspection of the data suggests that the series is stationary. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these data graphed in Figure 2 is the rise, and subsequent fall, in the years between the Single European Act (1996) and the Treaty on European Union (1992). Nevertheless, there is quite a lot of volatility in the series suggesting, at least in the aggregate, that short term factors are affecting the levels of support for the EU. Figure 3 shows the positive and negative responses to the *unification* question, also aggregated by Eurobarometer -- though it is a shorter series due to data availability, from spring 1975 to autumn 1996 (with no data for 1976 to spring 1978). Although there is some volatility within the positive and negative categories (“somewhat” and “very for”/“against”), Figure 2 demonstrates that there is very little variance over time in the

aggregate of positive and negative responses in this variable. The data graphed in Figures 2 and 3 tend to support the assertion that the *unification* question is more likely to measure stable and therefore affective support, whereas the *membership* question is more likely to take account of utilitarian support, and therefore is subject to influences from short-term factors such as economic expectations.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

#### *Party Influence*

To measure the influence of partisanship on support for the EU it is necessary to separate individuals into categories according to the political party they support. The variable used to gauge partisanship is taken from a vote intention question. This is worded as follows, although the precise wording is slightly different depending on the particularities of the country:

“If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you support?”

This question identifies the various parties in all nine countries of the analysis. However, this accounts for over one hundred parties, and the main interest of this chapter is to look at the generalisability across the EU. Therefore, to create variables that are non-country-specific, eight dummy variables were created according to the various “party families” that are common across Western Europe. Much research looks at familiarities and differences between European parties and party systems (see for example, Budge, Robertson & Hearl 1987, Laver & Hunt 1992, Huber & Inglehart 1995). To create the main explanatory variables, the classification of party families is taken from Hix and Lord (1997). They separate European parties into the following “families”<sup>2</sup>: Conservative, Christian Democrat, Liberal, Socialist, Green, Radical Left, Extreme Right and Regionalist<sup>3</sup>. The distribution of party families among respondents with a preference can be seen in Figure 4. The data are aggregated by biannual Eurobarometer ranging from 1975 to 1999. As can be seen from Figure 4, the Socialist party family is the largest throughout this period. The distribution of party share over time is fairly consistent, although from around 1991-92 there is an increase in Socialist and Liberal party “identifiers” at the expense of Conservatives and Christian Democrats.

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

It is expected that for all the major party families there is likely to be an increase in levels of support for the EU. However, there are also likely to be major differences between these party families. It is expected that the most likely party family to influence support for the EU is the Liberal one. Liberal parties have historically been very pro-integrationist in their policy platforms, and the progress of regional integration has also been in line with the principal tenets of liberalism, which emphasises economic and social freedoms (Hix & Lord 1997, 32-33). The major parties of the right, Conservatives and Christian Democrats, are also expected to influence support positively. However, the two centre-right parties differ significantly along the European integration dimension. Hix and Lord state that the major differences are that the ‘supra-national’ origins of Christian democracy are much more conducive to support for integration than the strongly ‘national’ origins of conservatism (1997, 29-30). Nevertheless, the economic nature of European integration has led to party support for the process for most of the existence of the EU. However, the increasingly social and political characteristic of the integration process since the Maastricht Treaty have seen a decrease in support from Conservative parties.

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<sup>2</sup> The list of political parties within each party family is included in Appendix B.


<sup>3</sup> Hix and Lord also create a party family classified as “Anti-Europeans”. However, these parties are extremely small and account for only a handful of cases in the available data. Therefore, the anti-European party family is omitted from the analysis.

The fourth major party family, comprised of Socialist parties, is much more divided in their support for the EU. The Socialist parties in the original founding member countries were much more sceptical of the process in the 1950s than the parties of the centre-right. This scepticism was also seen by internal divisions among the Socialist parties about joining the EU in the UK, Ireland and Denmark in the 1970s and Austria, Sweden and Finland in the 1990s. A further example of this internal division over the EU can be seen with the Socialist party in Norway. Divisions that occurred in the Norwegian Socialist party in both the 1970s and 1990s strongly influenced both referenda that resulted in Norway failing to join the EU. Socialist parties are still expected to exert a positive influence on support for the EU, although this influence is expected to be less than the parties of the centre-right, but increasing after the social reforms brought about by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

It can be expected that both party families at the extremes of the left-right dimension will be strongly anti-European in their outlook. Although at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, both party groupings are generally hostile towards liberal democratic institutions, such as the European Union. The parties of the radical left are made up of Communist parties and Independent Socialists. The parties of the extreme right are made up of neo-fascist parties, xenophobic and strongly nationalist parties. All the extreme parties campaigned against ratification of the Maastricht treaty<sup>4</sup>, or membership of the EU in the Austrian and Swedish referendums in 1994.

Of the smaller parties, only the Greens exist in all member states. There is little cohesion within this group regarding support for the EU, with policy positions mixed between support for regional-level environmental measures, but scepticism towards the bureaucratic infrastructure of the EU (Hix & Lord 1997, 38). However, all Green parties with representation in national parliaments either voted against or abstained from supporting the Maastricht Treaty, or opposed joining the Union in the case of the 1995 joiners. Therefore, it is expected that the Green parties will have a negative influence towards support for the EU on its supporters. The final party family are the Regionalists, which Hix and Lord find “are generally more pro-European integration than the supporters of any other party family” (1987, 44). Although this group tends to be very diverse along traditional party cleavages, one area of convergence is their support for a system that would replace the existing nation states with a ‘Europe of Regions’.

According to Hix and Lord (1997), the expected positions of the eight party families can be summarised along the following pro/anti-integration continuum:



#### *Control Variables*

Economic factors have frequently been used to explain variations in the levels of public support for European integration. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) use indicators of the national

<sup>4</sup> Although there was one exception with Izquierda Unida in Spain. However, Spanish parties are not included in this analysis.

macroeconomy to explain support for the EU. They adapt their theory from the literature that links economic conditions with support for governments (Lewis-Beck 1988, Norpoth, Lewis-Beck & Lafay 1992). Eichenberg and Dalton argue that economic factors are important for explaining support for national institutions, which can be extended to a supranational institution (EU), which is common to EU member countries. They postulate that the continued justification for the EU lies in “the promise of increased prosperity that it will produce” (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, 513). The best gauge for economic conditions are those on a national level, and Eichenberg and Dalton use the three most common indicators for explaining macroeconomic voting functions: inflation, unemployment and economic growth. These variables have been used in the subsequent analysis in this chapter. The data are taken from the OECD and are collated for each country in each year. Standard operational measurements for these variables are used: inflation is measured by the year on year percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), unemployment is measured by the annual percentage of the population unemployed and economic growth is measured by year on year percentage change in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Following on from previous research increases in growth, and decreases in inflation and unemployment, should lead to increases in support for European integration.

A more successful set of economic variables in both voting and popularity functions are variables that account for the subjective evaluation of the economy by individuals (For example: Kiewiet 1983, Lewis-Beck 1990, Nannestad & Paldam 1994). Much of this debate focuses on whether the best predictor of vote or party support is evaluations of the past (retrospective) or future (prospective), or between evaluations of a respondent’s personal (egocentric) or the national (sociotropic) economic situation. However, Nannestad and Paldam (2000) find that it is difficult to separate one measure from another, which suggests that all four measures are essentially tapping into the same underlying phenomenon. Subjective evaluations of the economy have also been used to explain support for the EU. Gabel and Whitten (1997) agree with Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) hypothesis that economic conditions are closely related to political attitudes such as support for the EU. However, they contend that measures of the objective economy are ‘noisy’ measures of economic perceptions. Their analysis reveals that both national and personal retrospective evaluations of the economy are positively correlated with individual support for the EU. Following from Gabel and Whitten’s work, a model incorporating subjective evaluations is also included. Unfortunately a long series of subjective economic expectations is not available with Eurobarometer data. From 1990 onwards every other Eurobarometer does include a question that asks for an individual’s personal economic expectations. Between 1980 and 1989 every other Eurobarometer includes a question which asked “As far as you are concerned, do you think that next year (19..) will be better, worse or the same than this year (19..)?” Although not perfect, this variable makes a reasonable proxy for a subjective economic variable. Figure 5 shows the aggregated time-series data of the two variables, with a vertical line of demarcation between the two. Both variables are relatively volatile throughout the period, although the inclusion of a curve representing the mean shows that the difference between positive and negative evaluations is very constant. The results that are shown below in Table 4 are very similar if only pre- or post-1989 data.

[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

A further body of research that has found convincing explanations of support for the EU is that which uses the “socialisation of membership” hypothesis, which Bosch and Newton (1995) describe as ‘familiarity breeds content’. The basic theme of this research posits that the longer an individual’s country is a member of the EU, the greater opportunity that individual has of receiving or recognising benefits of membership (see also Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996). Bosch and Newton (1995) find that the socialisation thesis outperforms economic models in their empirical analysis. This variable is simply the number of years a particular individual’s country

has been a member of the EU. For example, a British respondent in 1975 would be coded as 2 or a Frenchman in 1990 would be coded as 39.

A large body of work by Ronald Inglehart (1970, 1971, with Rabier 1978) suggests two theories of political culture that influence public support for European integration: cognitive mobilisation and post-materialism, although the latter has largely been dismissed as a factor influencing support for integration (see Janssen 1991, Anderson and Reichert 1996, Gabel 1998a, 1998b). A high level of cognitive mobilisation increases an individual's capacity to receive and process messages relating to remote political objects, with European integration being one of the many possibilities (Inglehart 1971, 181). As such, variables for education and political interest are all included in the analysis, with the expectation that an increase in any of the variables will increase support for integration. The political interest variables are responses to the following questions:

“When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently (3), occasionally (2), or never (1)?”

“When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen often (4), from time to time (3), rarely (2), never (1)?”

The education variable is one which measures the age the respondent was on leaving school, collapsed into four categories. Gabel (1998a) also uses levels of education to explain citizen support for the EU. He identifies that EU citizens with high education levels are better able to adapt their skills to economic changes brought about by labour market liberalisation. Poorly educated workers have less valuable skills, which make them more expendable in economic downturn or heightened competition (Gabel 1998a, 42-44). Gabel also finds that support for the EU is dependent on an individual's income level. He explains that the liberalisation of capital markets created by European integration has advantaged wealthier citizens better able to take advantage of the increased investment opportunities. In contrast, those on lower incomes are further disadvantaged because of capital liberalisation creating competition between states to offer low taxes as incentives to lure businesses. This decrease in taxes harms the poorest the most as they are the greater beneficiaries from higher tax receipts (Gabel 1998a, 46-47).

Gender has also been found to be a predictor of support for the EU. This difference is based on the premise that women are among the ‘losers’ of market liberalisation because of their position in the labour market (see Gelleny and Anderson 2000). Nelsen and Guth (2000) suggest that one of the reasons for the gender gap is an ideological difference, with men being, in general, more nationalistic. Thus gender is included in the analysis to control for this effect. This variable is coded with 1 as male and 0 as female, therefore a positive impact is expected.

Descriptive statistics for all variables used for analysis in this chapter are included in Appendix A.

### *Methodology*

The choice of methodology is dictated both by the structure of the data and the nature of the dependent variable. The data are compiled in a pooled cross-sectional time-series dataset. This type of dataset is renowned for its associated methodological problems (see Stimson 1985, Sayrs 1989 or Beck and Katz 1995), particularly autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. However, the former is not applicable to a pooled random sample of individual cross-sections. The problem of heteroskedasticity can be controlled for by incorporating variables for the cross-sections and

units, countries and years, into the right hand side of the model (see Alvarez and Brehm 1995, but Gabel 1998c for use with similar data)<sup>5</sup>.

The dependent variable, support for the EU as measured by the *membership* question, is ordinal. Traditionally researchers have often treated ordinal dependent variables as if they were interval and used a linear regression model. However, linear estimation techniques are inappropriate as they make the, almost certainly inaccurate<sup>6</sup>, assumption that the distance between A and B is equal to that between B and C. There is a range of diagnostics to demonstrate the inappropriateness of linear estimation for this data. One diagnostic used to test for violations of the basic assumptions of an Ordinary Least Squares regression is shown in Figure 6. Figure 6 is a test whether the estimation (of equation 1, shown below) violates the assumption of normality, the assumption that the residuals are distributed normally. If the residuals are distributed symmetrically, i.e. normally, then all points would lie on the reference line. Clearly this is not the case in Figure 6. This suggests that a linear estimator for the model in equation [1] would be inappropriate.

[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]

For this analysis maximum likelihood techniques are required, and in particular those for an ordinal categorical dependent variable ordered logit<sup>7</sup>. This model, introduced to the social sciences by Mckelvey and Zavoina (1975), derives from a measurement model in which a latent variable is mapped onto an observed variable. The observed variable is considered as providing incomplete information about the underlying variable. As a result the thresholds of change, or cutpoints, are also parameters to be estimated along with the coefficients determining support for the dependent variable (For a greater exposition of the ordered logit model see in particular Long 1997, chapter 5, but also Kennedy 1992, Greene 2000). We can therefore express the model for explaining vote choice as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EU support}_{ti}^* = & \alpha + \beta_{1-8}\text{party}_{ti} + \beta_{9-12}\text{economic conditions}_{ti} + \beta_{13}\text{length of membership}_{ti} + \\ & \beta_{14-15}\text{cognitive attitudes}_{ti} + \beta_{16-20}\text{demographics}_{ti} \\ & + \beta_{21-28}\text{country dummies}_{ti} + \beta_{29-53}\text{year dummies}_{ti} + \varepsilon_{ti} \end{aligned} \quad [1]$$

In the interest of space and parsimony the explanatory variables in equation 1 are actually groups of independent variables, discussed in greater length in the next section. The dependent variable in Equation 1 is the estimated latent variable, with thresholds ( $\tau$ ) estimated from the observed dependent variable as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EU Support}_i = & \begin{array}{ll} 1 \Rightarrow \text{bad} & \text{if } \tau_0 = -\infty \leq \text{EU Support}_i^* \\ 2 \Rightarrow \text{neither} & \text{if } \tau_1 \leq \text{EU Support}_i^* < \tau_2 \\ 3 \Rightarrow \text{good} & \text{if } \tau_2 \leq \text{EU Support}_i^* < \tau_3 = \infty \end{array} \end{aligned}$$

### Results

The initial analysis is conducted using the party dummy variables as the main explanatory variables of interest. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1. The overall fit of the model can be gauged from the  $\chi^2$  statistic, which is statistically significant at the  $p > .000$  level. The

<sup>5</sup> Dummy variables for all countries and years, bar one, were included in the analysis.

<sup>6</sup> For a discussion of the substantive and theoretical consequences of poor model choice for ordered and categorical dependent variables see Whitten and Palmer (1996).

<sup>7</sup> It could also be argued that a multinomial approach could be used for this variable, which does not require the assumption of order between the categories (see Anderson and Gelleny, 1999, with a similarly coded dependent variable). Statistically, however, there is little difference in the results of the two approaches for this research.

model correctly predicts 63.6% of the cases. The prediction of heteroskedasticity due to national context can be tested using a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (Alvarez and Brehm 1995, Gabel 1998c). This test compares the unrestricted model with the log likelihood of the restricted model (that includes dummies for countries and years). The LR test reported in Table 1 indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that the error variances are homoskedastic, therefore the restricted model including dummy variables for the various countries and years is appropriate.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The coefficients for independent variables in an ordered logit model are difficult to interpret. The substantive significance of the independent variables cannot be determined by comparing the size of the coefficients. To better interpret the parameter estimates it is helpful to estimate the effect of a unit change in each variable on the probability of responding in one of the three categories of the dependent variable. The marginal impact of each independent variable is calculated while holding constant all other independent variables at their means. The third numerical column in Table 1 shows the marginal effects of one unit change in the independent variable on the probability of seeing the EU as a good thing. The effects of moving from the minimum in the particular independent variable to the maximum are in the fourth numerical column of Table 1.

All the party variables in the analysis are significant and in the hypothesised direction, with the exception of the variable for the Green parties, which is positively correlated with support for the EU. Interpretation of the marginal effects of the party variables is largely as expected, with the parties of the centre right the best positive predictors of support, and the extreme parties the best negative predictors of support for the EU. According to the model in Table 1 a respondent who is aligned to a party of the Liberal party for example, with all other variables held at their mean, is 13 percentage points more likely to see his/her country's membership of the EU as a good thing.

All the independent control variables in Table 1 are significant in the hypothesised direction with the exception of the length of membership variable, which is unexpectedly negative. However, this is more of an artefact of the including dummy variables for years imposed to reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity. The variance of the length of membership variable is almost certainly explained by the temporal dummies included in the analysis (not shown). The predicted probabilities of the macroeconomic variables show that, although statistically significant, their substantive significance is minimal. For example, a one unit increase in the two hardship variables, unemployment (1% of the workforce out of work) and inflation (1% increase in prices from the previous year), would, in turn, only decrease a respondent's likelihood of supporting the EU by one percentage point, holding all other explanatory variables at their means. The substantive effect of economic growth is even smaller. The demographic and control variables that demonstrate the greatest substantive effects are those for income and education. Consistent with Gabel's (1998a) human capital and income hypotheses, higher levels of education and wealth are significant predictors of support for integration. The substantive effect of a respondent moving from the lowest to the highest category of education will increase that respondent's likelihood of supporting the EU by 19 percentage points. The variables for gender and political interest, although being statistically significant, have little substantive effect on support for the EU.

#### *Strength of Party Attachment*

To test the proposition that an individual's party influences his/her stance on European integration, the party choice question alone is a fairly rough indicator of partisan attachment. In order to further explain the influence of party, the dummy variables for the eight party families are multiplied by responses to the following question:

“Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? (If so), do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close or merely a sympathiser?”<sup>8</sup>

This variable has been coded from 1 to 4, with “no partisan affinities” coded 1, “merely a sympathiser” 2, “fairly close” 3 and “very close” to a particular party coded as 4. The party family variables now include a measure of the strength of party attachment. This is in line with the hypothesis that the stronger the identification with a particular party, the more likely that respondent is to adopt the party’s stance towards European integration.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Table 2 shows the analysis of equation 1 with the exception that the eight party variables now measure the strength of attachment to the particular party. Slightly constrained by the availability of party attachment data, the analysis is conducted between 1976 and 1996, which still includes over 320,000 cases. As with Table 1 all the party variables are significant and in the expected directions with the exception of the green parties. The overall performance of the model is very similar to that shown in Table 1. The percentage of correctly predicted cases is a little better at 64.2%, and the effects of the control variables virtually identical. However, as hypothesised, the party variables are able to explain much more about respondents’ attitudes towards the EU than the previous model. The Liberal party family, as expected, is the most positive in its effects on support for the EU. The predicted probability of supporting the EU for a very close identifier of a Liberal party is 22 percentage points more likely than for a respondent who does not support a Liberal party. Conservative and Christian Democrat party supporters demonstrate similar positive changes in predicted probabilities, with strong identifiers 20 and 17.5 percentage points more likely to support the EU.

However, the party family with the greatest substantive explanation is that for the supporters of the radical left. Very close identifiers of these parties are 27 percentage points less likely to support the EU, even when controlling for all other variables. This trend is similar for those supporters of the Extreme right-wing parties, with a substantive negative effect of 15 percentage points decrease in support for the EU for strong identifiers over those who do not identify with another party. The effects of the other three party families are much smaller. This is somewhat expected for the Socialist and Green parties which have quite divided over their support of integration during this period. However, when the control variables are taken into account individuals who identify with the regional party family are far from being the most supportive of the EU, as Hix and Lord (1997) find in their analysis.

The changes in the predicted probabilities can be viewed graphically in Figure 7. This graph demonstrates the huge range in explanatory power of the strength of attachment to the parties, within the classification of the party families used here. The most marked difference that can be seen in Figure 7 are between the Centre Right parties and the extreme left parties. The average difference in the predicted probability of a positive response to European integration for a strong identifier with a Liberal party increases by 23 percentage points from a non-identifier. However, for a strong identifier with a party of the radical left the probability of a positive response to their country’s EU membership decreases by 27 percentage points. Figure 7 demonstrates the huge

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<sup>8</sup> Richard Sinnott (1998) makes the observation that the English language version of this question is actually slightly different from the French language version, which is used to translate into all other languages. The English version asks an absolute question “Do you consider yourself close to any particular party?” whereas the French version asks a relative question “Do you consider yourself closer to one party than the others?” Therefore, responses from the UK and Ireland may slightly underestimate the level of party attachment compared with other countries.

gulf - 47 percentage points amongst their strong identifiers- between these parties at the opposite ends of support for the EU.

[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]

#### *Subjective Economic Effects*

Extensive research in the voting behaviour literature, and some on the support for European integration (Gabel and Whitten 1997), finds that subjective evaluations of the economy are much better predictors of economic effects than the actual economy. This research emphasises the knowledge gap between how individuals understand the economy is performing and how the economy is actually performing. It also reflects the unequal distribution of economic circumstances – good or bad, which are not picked up by national-level indicators. To test whether subjective or objective economic indicators are better at explaining individual levels of support for the EU, a personal economic expectations variable was added included to equation 1. These results are presented in Table 3. The subjective economic question is only asked in every other Eurobarometer between 1980 and 1996, therefore this analysis is over both a shorter period of time, and with less cases than in Table 2. However, with 16 time points and over 80,000 cases this is more than adequate for testing the effects of the model. Because of the difference in data source the results are not directly comparable with those presented in Table 2, therefore the model used in Table 2 is replicated on the same available data and the marginal effects are presented in parentheses in Table 3<sup>9</sup>.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

As hypothesised personal economic expectations has a positive effect on support for the EU. The macroeconomic indicators for inflation, unemployment and economic growth are also significant and in the hypothesised direction. However, looking at the predicted probabilities of the economic variables shows that there is a major difference between the explanatory power of these variables in this model. With all else being equal an individual who has a positive, rather than a negative, evaluation of his/her future economic situation is 11 percentage points more likely to support the EU. In contrast, a 5% increase in the inflation rate from the previous year, for example, will decrease the probability of an individual supporting the EU by only 3 percentage points, controlling for all other variables in the model.

#### *Temporal Variation*

Anderson and Reichart identify a number of areas where they see previous research has faltered, such as Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and Gabel and Palmer (1995). They argue that cross-temporal research is flawed because of the variance in the time parameter, i.e. the assumption that economic benefits affect citizen attitudes similarly at different point in time. They also argue that the EU cannot be compared with the EC or EEC because what integration meant in 1975 and what it means in 1992 are completely different. Perhaps the most significant difference in the structure of the EU was after the passing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. Gabel (1998c) finds some significant differences in his results when he runs his model separately for before and after the SEA. The second major reform of the EU was the treaty on European Union, which was signed in Maastricht in February 1992. Therefore to test the robustness of the model, ordered logit estimations were made on the data for the different time periods. Table 4 replicates the model used for Table 2 for three separate periods, before the signing of the SEA, after the signing of the TEU and the point between those two major changes. The results from Table 2 are also included to aid comparability. The marginal effects of these models are presented in Table 5.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

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<sup>9</sup> The coefficients and standard errors, not shown, are extremely similar and the levels of statistical significance are not changed between the two models.

The model divided into the separate time periods is still robust. Both chi2 statistics allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the effects of the independent variables are equal to zero. In terms of correctly predicted cases, the model performs better in the period between the SEA and TEU with 69.5% of cases correctly predicted. The performance of the model in the Pre-SEA and Post-TEU periods is similar to the overall model correctly predicting 62.4% and 63.1% of cases respectively. The differences in the significance of the party variables make intuitive sense. Before the SEA the variables for the Green, Extreme Right and Regionalist party families are not significant. In fact the variable for Regionalist parties is not significant until the period after Maastricht. All three of these parties are relatively 'new' in terms of popular support in the life of the European Union. Perhaps one of the most interesting results is the change in the effects of the parties of the right. Before the SEA Conservative party support had much greater positive effects on support for the EU than those of the Christian Democrats. However, the effects are virtually identical in the period between the treaties, and the effects are greater for Christian Democrats after Maastricht. For example the probability of a strong identifier with a Conservative party before 1987 is 26 percentage points more likely to support the EU than non-Conservative identifiers, but this probability falls to just 12 percentage points after 1992. This would appear to support the cue-giving hypothesis, when considering the divisions over policy and increased caution towards Europe in the 1990s among major Conservative parties such as the Conservative Party in the UK and the RPR in France.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

In terms of the political economy hypotheses, there is support for the conclusion of Gabel and Whitten (1997) that the effects of objective measures of the macroeconomy are inconsistent. None of the three indicators has consistently significant, or even correctly signed, coefficients in each period. In fact, unemployment is insignificant in all the truncated periods, and inflation even has a positive and significant effect on public support for integration after 1992. This latter result lends credence to Gamble's (1995) assertion that support for the EU is linked to negative economic circumstances, as individuals increase support for the EU as an alternative to their national institutions in managing the economy. There are also some interesting results for the other control variables. Income and age decrease in importance as explanatory factors for EU support, whereas the influence of education appears to be increasing.

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

To further investigate the temporal differences, the model was applied to the data from each year separately<sup>10</sup>. These results are shown in Table 6. For ease of interpretation only the marginal effects are shown. These marginal effects are the change in the probability of seeing the EU as a good thing when individuals move from the minimum to the maximum of a single explanatory variable, holding all other variables at their means. For the macroeconomic indicators and the length of membership variables the change is the average change in one unit of the independent variable, as a change from the minimum to the maximum is nonsensical. The significance of the coefficients is noted, although the coefficients and standard errors are not shown.

There are some very interesting trends that are shown by the results in Table 6. The decrease of the Conservative party family as the most positive predictor of EU support among the right wing parties further confirms the evidence presented in Tables 4 and 5. In 1990 the Christian Democrats replaced the Conservatives as the most supportive towards the EU of the right wing parties, and subsequently increased this gap over the Conservative parties. Perhaps the most interesting finding from Table 6 is the change in effects of the Socialist party families. Prior to the signing of the Single European Act, the predicted probabilities of Socialist respondents is small,

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<sup>10</sup> There are no results from the 1995 data because no data is available for the strength of party attachment variable in that year.

and even negative in 1983. However, these probabilities continue to increase after the SEA, to the extent that by 1996 a strong Socialist identifier is likely to be more positive than a strong Conservative identifier. This is shown graphically in Figure 8. Interestingly this convergence is mirrored by the parties of the left and right at the extremes. This can also be seen graphically in Figure 9.

[FIGURES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE]

### *Spatial Variation*

The evidence from Tables 1 to 6 allows us to generalise the impact of parties across countries, in which there are some clear and interesting themes. However, it is not always appropriate to generalise about institutional contexts that can be quite different, and which often contain more differences than similarities. Therefore, to test the robustness of the findings so far, the model was also applied to the data for each of the nine countries in turn. These results are presented in Table 7. As with Table 6, only the marginal effects are reported, along with the significance of the coefficients.

[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

The first difference to note between these nine ordered logit estimations is the performance of the models in the separate countries. The model is extremely successful in accurately predicting support for the EU in the Netherlands, with 83% of the 35,560 cases correctly predicted. However, the model works less well in the UK where only 49% of the cases are correctly predicted, or Denmark where just under 54% of the cases are correctly predicted. In these two countries the populations are traditionally more sceptical of the process of European integration, and the political parties have tended to hold a more integrationist stance than the population as a whole during this period. In this situation the party cue thesis appears to be less explanatory than in the other countries. Denmark, however, is perhaps the most interesting case shown in Table 7. Denmark is a country where the political parties have very clear positions on the EU, and this is shown in the effects on their supporters. The Christian Democratic (Kristeligt Folkeparti) and Liberal (Venstre) parties, have very positive stances towards the EU. This is obviously clear to their supporters who claim to be strongly supportive of these parties, as they are more likely to support the EU by 46 and 47 percentage points than individuals who do not identify with those parties. This effect is mirrored by the anti-European stances taken by the Radical Left (Socialistisk Folkeparti) and Green parties, where the negative effect is almost as great, 44 and 41 percentage points respectively.

A further interesting difference shown in Table 7 is with the Socialist parties from the founding and later member countries; the effects are positive for the former and negative for the latter. However, in line with the general trend for the Socialist party family, this trend in Denmark, Ireland and the UK is becoming more positive over time. This could suggest that there is in fact a socialisation effect for Socialist parties within the EU, or that the EU is becoming more of a Social Democratic institution than the economically liberal one it was prior to the Maastricht treaty.

[FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE]

It may be more illuminating to see the effects of the strength of party attachment variables for the specific parties in specific countries graphically. Figure 10 shows 9 country specific graphs of a selection of the marginal effects for party variables from the estimations produced by the ordered logits presented in Table 7. In the interest of clarity I have limited the graphs to the curves for just 3 parties per country. A visual inspection of these 9 graphs shows relatively clearly that the slopes, and for the most part levels, of the centre-right and centre-left parties are almost identical in the original 6 members, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. However, there is a marked difference between the effects in Britain, Ireland and Denmark. The

effects of the smaller parties are very similar across countries, although only a selection is shown here.

### *Conclusion*

This chapter has sought to identify the robustness of the partisanship of support for the European Union. The results for the general model emphasise the strength and consistency of party-cues in explaining the choice of individuals to support (oppose) European integration. There are also some deviations from this generalised model, which were identified by the temporal and spatial developments of this model. However, it is the similarities across time and over countries that prove to be the most remarkable. This link between public support for the EU and political parties will be further investigated in the following chapters, which test relationship at the aggregated state level and use manifestoes and expert evaluations to further explain the influences of parties on opinion.

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**TABLE 1 Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership**

Dependent variable: Support for EU membership 1975-99

(dummy variables for countries and years not shown)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	Coefficient	Std error	Marginal (1 unit)	Effects (min-max)
			Category=good	
Christian Democrat	.493**	(.012)	.106	
Conservative	.602**	(.014)	.125	
Liberal	.617**	(.012)	.130	
Socialist	.222**	(.009)	.050	
Green	.182**	(.020)	.040	
Regional	.173**	(.027)	.039	
Radical Left	-.729**	(.015)	-.177	
Extreme Right	-.493**	(.024)	-.119	
Inflation	-.053**	(.002)	-.011	
Unemployment	-.085**	(.002)	-.014	
GDP	.043**	(.002)	.010	
Length	-.030**	(.001)	-.005	
Income – highest quartile	.240**	(.002)	.054	
Income – lowest quartile	-.128**	(.009)	-.030	
Age	.010**	(.002)	.002	.011
Education	.299**	(.005)	.074	.193
Sex (male=1, female=0)	.123**	(.007)	.028	
Discuss politics	.137**	(.006)	.033	.062
Persuade friends	.058**	(.004)	.014	.040
% Correct	63.6%			
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	65568**	(53)		
Log Likelihood	-338125			
LR Test	9868.69**			
N	409136			

\*\* denotes .01 significance level

**TABLE 2 Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership**

Dependent variable: Support for EU membership 1976-96

(dummy variables for countries and years not shown)

<u>Independent Variables</u>	Coefficient	Std error	Marginal (1 unit)	Effects (min-max)
				Category=good
Christian Democrat*Party Attachment	.222**	(.006)	.050	.175
Conservative*Party Attachment	.267**	(.006)	.059	.199
Liberal*Party Attachment	.301**	(.006)	.067	.221
Socialist*Party Attachment	.084**	(.004)	.019	.074
Green*Party Attachment	.068**	(.011)	.015	.060
Regional*Party Attachment	.033*	(.014)	.008	.030
Radical Left*Party Attachment	-.276**	(.006)	-.065	-.268
Extreme Right*Party Attachment	-.150**	(.011)	-.035	-.146
Inflation	-.053**	(.002)	-.011	
Unemployment	-.062**	(.003)	-.012	
GDP	.029**	(.003)	.007	
Length	-.005**	(.001)	-.001	
Income – highest quartile	.237**	(.010)	.053	
Income – lowest quartile	-.127**	(.010)	-.029	
Age	.006*	(.003)	.002	.007
Education	.290**	(.005)	.072	.188
Sex (male=1, female=0)	.127**	(.008)	.029	
Discuss politics	.113**	(.006)	.027	.051
Persuade friends	.048**	(.004)	.011	.033
% Correct	64.2%			
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	53834**	(48)		
Log Likelihood	-264375			
N	323073			
** denotes .01 significance level			* denotes .05 significance level	

**TABLE 3 Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership**

Dependent variable: Support for EU membership 1980-96

(dummy variables for countries and years not shown)

	Coefficient	Std Error	Marginal (1 unit)	Effects (min-max)
<u>Independent Variables</u>				
Christian Democrat*Party Attachment	.187**	(.011)	.034(.035)	.116(.118)
Conservative*Party Attachment	.255**	(.013)	.045(.049)	.145(.151)
Liberal*Party Attachment	.259**	(.011)	.046(.049)	.148(.148)
Socialist*Party Attachment	.055**	(.009)	.010(.009)	.039(.035)
Green*Party Attachment	-.002	(.022)	-.001(-.001)	-.002(-.003)
Regional*Party Attachment	.007	(.028)	.001(.000)	.005(.000)
Radical Left*Party Attachment	-.293**	(.013)	-.057(-.057)	-.264(-.267)
Extreme Right*Party Attachment	-.175**	(.026)	-.034(-.035)	-.150(-.157)
Personal Economic Expectations	.307**	(.010)	.069	.114
Inflation	-.038**	(.005)	-.006(-.007)	
Unemployment	-.022**	(.008)	-.004(-.004)	
GDP	.024**	(.005)	.004(.005)	
Length	-.694	(1.19)	-.001(-.001)	
Income – highest quartile	.248**	(.021)	.044(.046)	
Income – lowest quartile	-.161**	(.020)	-.031(-.031)	
Age	.027*	(.005)	.005(.003)	.025(.015)
Education	.275**	(.011)	.061(.064)	.142(.146)
Sex (male=1, female=0)	.110**	(.015)	.020(.020)	
Discuss politics	.125**	(.013)	.025(.022)	.046(.041)
Persuade friends	.034**	(.008)	.007(.008)	.019(.022)
% Correct	65.5%			
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	14566**	(40)	Figures in parentheses are the marginal effects for the model on the same cases, but without the Personal Expectations variable	
Log Likelihood	-64232			
N	80800			

\*\* denotes .01 significance level

\* denotes .05 significance level

**TABLE 4 Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership**

Dependent variable: Support for EU membership

(dummy variables for countries and years not shown)

	Full 1976-96	Pre-SEA 1976-86	SEA-TEU 1987-92	Post TEU 1992-96
<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Coefficients</u>			
Christian Democrat*Party Attachment	.222**	.217**	.196**	.240**
Conservative*Party Attachment	.267**	.350**	.196**	.149**
Liberal*Party Attachment	.301**	.298**	.311**	.334**
Socialist*Party Attachment	.084**	.045**	.086**	.163**
Green*Party Attachment	.068**	.034	.045*	.135**
Regional*Party Attachment	.033*	-.0004	.001	.067*
Radical Left*Party Attachment	-.276**	-.313**	-.326**	-.167**
Extreme Right*Party Attachment	-.150**	-.008	-.145**	-.309**
Inflation	-.053**	-.007*	.007	.060**
Unemployment	-.062**	.003	.012	-.015
GDP	.029**	.025**	-.004	.015
Length	-.005**	.145**	.091**	.093**
Income – highest quartile	.237**	.235**	.272**	.166**
Income – lowest quartile	-.127**	-.159**	-.152**	-.041*
Age	.006*	.010**	.009*	-.007
Education	.290**	.262**	.299**	.342**
Sex (male=1, female=0)	.127**	.114**	.160**	.141**
Discuss politics	.113**	.097**	.109**	.189**
Persuade friends	.048**	.039**	.066**	.055**
% Correct	64.2%	62.4%	69.5%	63.1%
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.)	53834** (48)	33656** (38)	12982** (33)	10106** (31)
Log Likelihood	-264375	-133048	-73974	-67430
N	323073	159583	98375	80421

\*\* denotes .01 significance level

\* denotes .05 significance level

**TABLE 5**

**Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership**  
**(Marginal effects of Models shown in Table 4)**

Dependent variable: Support for EU membership

(dummy variables for countries and years not shown)

	Full 1976-96	Pre-SEA 1976-86	SEA-TEU 1987-92	Post TEU 1992-96
<u>Independent Variables</u>	<u>Marginal Effects, minδmax (category=good)</u>			
Christian Democrat*Party Attachment	.175	.184	.136	.186
Conservative*Party Attachment	.199	.258	.134	.123
Liberal*Party Attachment	.221	.234	.193	.240
Socialist*Party Attachment	.074	.041	.066	.136
Green*Party Attachment	.060	.293	.035	.113
Regional*Party Attachment	.030	-.003	.001	.059
Radical Left*Party Attachment	-.268	-.302	-.309	-.163
Extreme Right*Party Attachment	-.146	-.006	-.131	-.300
Inflation (Δ in 1 unit)	-.011	-.002	.001	.014
Unemployment (Δ in 1 unit)	-.012	.001	.003	-.003
GDP (Δ in 1 unit)	.007	.006	-.001	.003
Length (Δ in 1 unit)	-.001	.014	.014	.007
Income – highest quartile	.053	.054	.054	.038
Income – lowest quartile	-.029	-.039	-.032	-.010
Age	.007	.015	.009	-.008
Education	.188	.176	.171	.222
Sex (male=1, female=0)	.029	.027	.033	.032
Discuss politics	.051	.050	.044	.086
Persuade friends	.033	.027	.041	.038

**TABLE 6 Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership by Year** (Dependent variable: Support for EU membership)

Marginal Effects (category=good) min-max (except for macroeconomic and length variables)

Independent Variables	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Christian Democrat	.161**	.195**	.185**	.211**	.159**	.208**	.150**	.170**	.229**	.171**
Conservative	.279**	.261**	.243**	.277**	.273**	.327**	.280**	.235**	.244**	.239**
Liberal	.258**	.250**	.276**	.265**	.257**	.250**	.237**	.167**	.245**	.176**
Socialist	.043*	.079**	.102**	.082**	.056*	.030	.054*	-.039*	.035*	.024
Green		.215	.205*	.019	-.017	-.002	.091	-.097	.089	.012
Regional	-.003	.025	-.018	.045	.094	-.080	-.068	-.039	.129*	.057
Radical Left	-.362**	-.257**	-.262**	-.312**	-.332**	-.277**	-.268**	-.334**	-.299**	-.292**
Extreme Right	.025	.078	.122*	.062	-.007	.033	-.140*	-.142*	-.105	-.189*
Inflation (1 unit Δ)	-.011**	-.004*	.006*	.034**	.004	-.001	.010**	.010*	.029**	.006
Unemployment (Δ)	.036**	-.008	.016**	-.023**	-.036**	-.013**	-.010**	-.004	-.009**	-.005
GDP (Δ in 1 unit)	-.021**	.047**	.050**	-.046**	.095**	.067**	-.065**	-.017*	.019*	.088**
Length (Δ in 1 unit)	.023**	.023**	.022**	.010**	.013**	.013**	.014**	.015**	.015**	.008**
Income – highest ¼	.083**	.061**	.050**	.053**	.053**	.037*	.056**	.075**	.045**	.051**
Income – lowest ¼	-.038**	-.050**	-.029*	-.051**	-.028	-.028*	-.039**	-.053**	-.049**	-.022*
Age	.024	-.028*	-.020	.006	-.003	.008	.041*	.018*	.027**	.002
Education	.185**	.149**	.153**	.148**	.198**	.192**	.215**	.171**	.202**	.171**
Sex	.018*	.025*	.044**	.019*	.029*	.033**	.017*	.015	.044**	.028**
Discuss politics	.076**	.041*	.026	.088**	.067**	.040*	.035*	.049*	.062**	.028*
Persuade friends	.029*	.025	.037**	.037*	.041*	.053**	.013	.009	.020	.028*
% Correct	61.5%	64.1%	63.9%	65.6%	62.6%	58.0%	59.1%	61.9%	61.1%	64.0%
N	14745	15035	14814	15036	9125	15235	15466	14559	15107	15284

\*\* denotes p>.001 significance level, \* p> .05 (levels of significance are z-scores for the ordered logit coefficients, not shown)

Dummy variables for countries not shown

**TABLE 6 continued - Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership by Year** (Dependent variable: Support for EU membership)

Marginal Effects (category=good) min-max (except for macroeconomic and length variables)

Independent Variables	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1996
Christian Democrat	.154**	.107**	.114**	.154**	.117**	.134**	.147**	.166**	.213**	.200**
Conservative	.214**	.172**	.192**	.151**	.113**	.082**	.062*	.140**	.167**	.120**
Liberal	.203**	.144**	.195**	.233**	.147**	.159**	.203**	.209**	.286**	.251**
Socialist	.011	.014	.041*	.069**	.047*	.063**	.111**	.114**	.147**	.151**
Green	.0002	.066	.056	.023	.048	-.029	.105**	.067*	.139*	.130**
Regional	-.152*	.0001	.023	-.021	-.035	-.069	.038	.025	.007	.091*
Radical Left	-.315**	-.334**	-.353**	-.262**	-.448**	-.338**	-.242**	-.252**	-.152**	-.120**
Extreme Right	-.054	-.040	-.043	-.065*	-.029	-.104*	-.347**	-.396**	-.275**	-.270**
Inflation (1 unit Δ)	.052**	-.034**	-.009*	.003	.032**	.069**	.093**	.064**	.142**	.158**
Unemployment (Δ)	-.013**	.027**	.031**	.025**	.019**	.021**	.008**	.036**	.002	-.013**
GDP (Δ in 1 unit)	.012*	-.005	.029**	.007*	.037**	.052**	.052**	.050**	.099**	.095**
Length (Δ in 1 unit)	.015**	.011**	.011**	.015**	.014**	.006**	.008**	.011**	.007**	.006**
Income – highest ¼	.034**	.068**	.061**	.054**	.085**	.065**	.009	.062**	-.014	.053**
Income – lowest ¼	-.039**	-.061**	-.057**	-.039**	-.028*	-.028**	.023*	-.027*	.053**	-.028**
Age	.006	.015	.015	.012	.005	.003	.019	.0004	-.065**	.008
Education	.151**	.145**	.186**	.168**	.161**	.156**	.196**	.216**	.144**	.240**
Sex	.026**	.016*	.025**	.041**	.027*	.026**	.045**	.041**	.020	.022**
Discuss politics	.015	.054**	.044**	.034**	.036*	.046**	.066**	.077**	.070**	.084**
Persuade friends	.017	.019	.064**	.042**	.078**	.025*	.037*	.045**	-.016	.052**
% Correct	66.4%	67.9%	66.6%	69.8%	69.8%	74.2%	68.7%	65.2%	61.1%	60.7%
N	15177	14804	15285	29628	7594	15758	15306	17980	9197	37938

\*\* denotes  $p > .001$  significance level, \*  $p > .05$  (levels of significance are z-scores for the ordered logit coefficients, not shown)

Dummy variables for countries not shown

**TABLE 7 Ordered Logit Model of Support for EU Membership by Country** (Dependent variable: Support for EU membership 1976-96)

Marginal Effects (category=good) min→max except for macroeconomic and length variables)

Independent Variables	France	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Denmark	Ireland	United Kingdom
Christian Democrat	.192**	.173**	.131**	.177**	.109**	.145**	.212**	.195**	
Conservative	.104**				.046		.463**		.171**
Liberal	.092**	.129**	.109**	.221**	.090**	.096**	.472**	.159**	.170**
Socialist	.115**	.041**	.087**	.177**	.090**	.079**	-.013	-.078**	-.037**
Green	.071**	.082**	.025	.141**	.089**	-.047	-.409**	-.182*	-.015
Regional		.094**			-.051			-.490**	-.069**
Radical Left	-.305**	-.049	-.085**	-.079*	-.057**	-.225**	-.441**	-.225**	
Extreme Right	-.328*	-.141**	-.433**	-.462**	-.037*	-.601	.047*		
Inflation (1 unit Δ)	-.019**	-.003**	-.006**	-.031**	.006	.004*	-.023**	.014**	-.004**
Unemployment (¶)	.035**	.025**	-.003	-.022**	-.005*	.027	.004**	-.001**	.003**
GDP (Δ in 1 unit)	-.036**	.002	-.005	-.023**	-.004**	-.011**	-.007**	.003*	-.040**
Length (Δ in 1 unit)	-.001**	-.003**	-.002**	.006**	.006**	-.002	-.003	.024**	-.0004
Income – highest ¼	.056**	.064**	.045**	.033**	.010*	.037**	.039**	.050**	.078**
Income – lowest ¼	-.029**	-.020*	-.021**	-.030**	-.034**	-.031**	-.038**	-.007	-.036**
Age	.062**	.0003	-.042**	.015	-.016*	.050**	.043**	-.011	-.012*
Education	.261**	.170**	.102**	.169**	.070**	.119**	.116**	.236**	.034**
Sex	.034**	.011*	-.00001	-.019**	.006	-.015	.088**	.063**	.035*
Discuss politics	.055**	.084**	.034**	.101**	.025**	.059**	-.003	.070**	.058**
Persuade friends	.052**	.084**	.050**	.078**	.041**	-.001	-.006	.004	.016**
% Correct	63.3%	68.4%	82.9%	61.8%	77.4%	79.6%	53.7%	64.6%	49.0%
N	39870	33935	35560	43655	39130	12311	35308	34008	49296

\*\* denotes p>.001 significance level, \* p> .05 (levels of significance are z-scores for the ordered logit coefficients, not shown)

## APPENDIX A

### Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Membership	460685	2.50	0.71	1	3
Unification	309183	3.06	0.82	1	4
<i>Party Variables</i>					
Conservative	460685	0.08	0.27	0	1
Christian Democrat	460685	0.14	0.35	0	1
Liberal	460685	0.14	0.35	0	1
Socialist	460685	0.22	0.41	0	1
Green	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
Radical Left	460685	0.05	0.22	0	1
Extreme Right	460685	0.02	0.13	0	1
Regional	460685	0.01	0.12	0	1
Conservative*Party Attachment	392446	0.17	0.64	0	4
Christian Democrat*Party Attachment	390213	0.30	0.85	0	4
Liberal*Party Attachment	390906	0.27	0.78	0	4
Socialist*Party Attachment	388113	0.45	0.99	0	4
Green*Party Attachment	394611	0.06	0.36	0	4
Radical Left*Party Attachment	393535	0.12	0.57	0	4
Extreme Right*Party Attachment	394443	0.04	0.31	0	4
Regional*Party Attachment	394452	0.03	0.25	0	4
<i>Macroeconomic Variables</i>					
Inflation (Year on Year % change in CPI)	460685	5.63	4.88	-0.7	24.2
Unemployment (% of population)	460685	8.57	3.22	0.2	17.1
Growth (Year on Year % change in Real GDP)	460685	2.51	2.20	-6.6	10.5
<i>Attitudinal Variables</i>					
Discuss Politics	446478	1.87	0.66	1	3
Persuade Friends	441834	2.47	0.98	1	4
Personal Economic Expectations	138805	2.03	0.75	1	3
<i>Demographics</i>					
Age	439362	3.40	1.65	1	6
Sex	460451	0.50	0.50	0	1
Education	450586	2.01	0.94	1	4
High Income (Upper Quartile)	460685	0.20	0.40	0	1
Low Income (Lower Quartile)	460685	0.18	0.39	0	1
<i>Socialisation Variable</i>					
Length of Membership	460685	24.76	10.67	2	42

**APPENDIX A - Descriptive Statistics, continued**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<i>Country Dummies</i>					
France	460685	0.12	0.32	0	1
Belgium	460685	0.11	0.31	0	1
Netherlands	460685	0.11	0.32	0	1
Germany	460685	0.14	0.35	0	1
Italy	460685	0.12	0.32	0	1
Luxembourg	460685	0.04	0.20	0	1
Denmark	460685	0.11	0.31	0	1
Ireland	460685	0.11	0.31	0	1
United Kingdom	460685	0.15	0.35	0	1
<i>Year Dummies</i>					
1975	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1976	460685	0.04	0.18	0	1
1977	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1978	460685	0.04	0.18	0	1
1979	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1980	460685	0.04	0.18	0	1
1981	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1982	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1983	460685	0.03	0.18	0	1
1984	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1985	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1986	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1987	460685	0.04	0.18	0	1
1988	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1989	460685	0.07	0.26	0	1
1990	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1991	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1992	460685	0.04	0.19	0	1
1993	460685	0.04	0.20	0	1
1994	460685	0.04	0.20	0	1
1995	460685	0.04	0.20	0	1
1996	460685	0.11	0.31	0	1
1997	460685	0.04	0.20	0	1
1998	460685	0.02	0.14	0	1
1999	460685	0.02	0.14	0	1